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Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler 
A common historical reading of the 1930s and World War I1 has long colored 
evaluations of regional monetary and trading blocs. Economists have typically 
appraised the global welfare implications of  blocs negatively in comparison 
to a global, multilateral economic order. Political scientists have associated a 
regionalized international order with heightened economic and even military 
conflict, although some have accepted the possibility of a benign regionalism. 
Policymakers, influenced by  these views, have hedged regional experiments 
with rules meant to reduce their discriminatory impact on nonmembers, most 
notably Article 24 of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
governing preferential trading arrangements. 
Until  recently, with  the important exception of  the European Economic 
Community (formed in 1957),  experiments in regionalism were more common 
among the developing countries, and even there, more likely to fail than not.’ 
Even the European Community seemed limited to a customs union (with a 
liberalized external tariff) and several joint policies, of which only agriculture 
had serious implications for the global trading system. The European Mone- 
tary System (founded in  1979) initially seemed to augur little more than its 
expressed aim of  forming a  zone of  monetary  stability in  Europe, a goal 
viewed with  skepticism by  many  outsiders despite the eventual success of 
the EMS. 
With the adoption of  the Single European Act in 1985 and the subsequent 
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movement toward economic, monetary, and political  union  in Europe in the 
199Os, the terms of  debate shifted drastically. The United States and Canada 
have signed a free trade agreement and have entered into negotiations with 
Mexico to extend that agreement to a North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Only Pacific Asia has not actively engaged in a regional project, 
and many have asked whether the economic prerequisites for a regional bloc, 
centered on Japan and similar to those in North America and Europe, are not 
already in place in East and Southeast Asia. 
If evidence for such a bloc-in-formation  could be marshaled, the implica- 
tions for the future of the global trading and monetary systems could be pro- 
found. Encompassing the most dynamic trading economies in the international 
economy and the world’s largest creditor nation, East and Southeast Asia have 
represented a major influence in favor of strengthening the multilateral  trade 
and monetary systems.* Their retreat into a regional project would knock away 
a major support for the global rules governing trade and monetary relations. In 
addition, the emergence of an East Asian bloc, however defined, could supply 
another item for the agenda of  bilateral  conflict between  the  United  States 
and Japan. 
The economists and political scientists contributing to this volume, then, are 
concerned with the ways in which the United States and Japan contribute to 
and are potentially affected by regionalism in East Asia. This is not, however, 
another work about United States-Japan  bilateral economic relations or a con- 
sideration of  the emerging tripolar global order. One could view each of  these 
papers as dealing with Japan’s use of its newfound economic power in one part 
of the post-Cold  War world-East  and Southeast Asia. 
In part I the case for an emerging East Asian trading and financial bloc is 
scrutinized and tested. Part  I1 deals with other elements in a possible Japan- 
centered bloc-particularly  foreign direct investment-and  the ways in which 
they might be expected to heighten the competitiveness of Japanese firms and 
increase Japanese influence in the region. The incentives and obstacles to Japa- 
nese leadership in Pacific Asia are described in part 111. 
A Bloc for the 1990s? Japan’s Trade, Finance, and Direct Investment in 
Pacific Asia 
Any Japan-centered economic bloc taking shape in Pacific Asia is not based 
on explicit, region-specific political arrangements. Such regional institutions 
have historically been weak or absent, whether the region is defined to include 
East and Southeast Asia only, extended to incorporate Australia, New Zealand, 
and the South Pacific, or equated with the Pacific Rim (including North and 
2. In  1991, a year in which the volume of world trade grew at a sluggish 3 percent (its slowest 
rate since 1983). “the six leading non-OECD traders [in Asia] reported growth rates of 10  to 20 
per cent for exports and 8 to 30 per cent for imports” (GATT Press Communiqut, 12 March 1992). 3  Introduction 
South America). The reasons for such weakness and the absence of  “hard,” 
politically  determined regionalism include a preference on the part  of  the 
United States for bilateral relationships with its major allies in Asia and the 
radical asymmetry (at least during the early years of  the Cold War) between 
the economic and military capabilities of  the United States on the one hand, 
and Japan and the other noncommunist Asian states on the other. Large quanti- 
ties of ink have been spilled on proposals for regional integration, but only the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as a persistent 
(and largely political) regional entity. 
As Stephen Haggard argues in his comment on Peter Petri’s paper, however, 
such a “hard,” politically driven route to regionalism is not the only route pos- 
sible. Peter Petri elaborates a path to regional political institutions through a 
functional response to  growing  economic interdependence among  Pacific 
Asian economies: politics follows economics, serving to manage the interde- 
pendence that is independently or “naturally” created by the actions of private 
agents. Petri, Jeffrey Frankel and Gary Saxonhouse scrutinize the evidence for 
growing “soft” regionalism of this variety, particularly regionalization centered 
on Japan. The level of trade interdependence within the region has been high 
during the postwar period, higher than one might expect from features such as 
geographical proximity. Both Petri and Frankel agree, however, that the trend 
in regional trade interdependence does not demonstrate a clear intensification 
of any intraregional bias during the post-1945 period. Indeed, Petri situates the 
post-1945 low point in regional trade interdependence in the mid-1980s. All 
three authors fail to find any pattern of Japan as a metropole in the regional 
pattern of trade; Frankel in particular suggests that the overseas Chinese (con- 
centrated in entrepats such as Hong Kong and Singapore) are more likely to 
provide an explanation for the high levels of intraregional trade. 
Given Japan’s  growing global financial role, one might expect to find  a 
stronger “Tokyo effect” through the financial markets. Any international ef- 
fects on national financial markets in the region, however, are muted by  the 
late, and still partial, liberalization of  financial flows. Although Japan’s influ- 
ence over interest rates has grown, it rivals that of the United States in only a 
few regional markets. The yen’s use as a peg for exchange rates in the region, 
in central bank reserves, and in invoicing trade and finance has also grown 
somewhat, but its role is far from dominant even after the expansion of Japan’s 
financial presence in the 1980s. 
To regard even these trends in the region as purely economic would be mis- 
taken. As Petri points out, one explanation for the historical level of regional 
trade interdependence in the region is investment in the infrastructure of partic- 
ular trade links, investment decisions that may  be influenced by  political or 
strategic calculations as well as economic ones. Larger international political 
changes also affect these patterns. The dismantling of  the Japanese colonial 
empire ended one variant of  “hard” regionalism that had forceably induced a 
high degree of regional trade interdependence. The decolonization of South- 4  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler 
east Asia after 1945 and the Cold War encouraged an extraregional trade strat- 
egy based on the US.  market, as colonial entrephts such as Singapore saw their 
role decline temporarily, and Japan was cut off from its traditional markets in 
China. 
If current trends in trade and finance fail to demonstrate a clear intensifica- 
tion of flows within the Pacific Asia region, and institutionalization at the polit- 
ical level has lagged behind other regions, it may be that our image of a bloc 
depends too heavily on past models of “hard’ regionalism based on politically 
determined discriminatory arrangements. It is in the area of foreign direct in- 
vestment  in  the region  by  Japan  and the use of  foreign aid that  some have 
identified the emergence of a “1990s model” bloc, different in external appear- 
ance from the European  Community  or NAFTA but closely integrated and 
centered on the Japanese economy. 
The economic basis for such arguments lies in the changing composition of 
foreign direct investment in the region since the mid-1980s. All of the signifi- 
cant activities of  foreign investors are not adequately captured by  the most 
readily available data-those  of  flows of foreign direct investment. Both in- 
vestment  financed within the country (or in offshore financial markets) and 
other overseas activities on the part of  firms may have important economic 
effects (such as cooperative arrangements with foreign firms and cooperation 
in production; see Doner, chap. 5 in this volume). Despite these shortcomings, 
it is worth noting a shift in the pattern of Japanese overseas investment flows 
associated with rapid appreciation of the yen that took place in the late 1980s. 
The absolute value of  Japanese foreign direct investment increased dramati- 
cally, and even though the share directed to the Asian developing countries 
declined  somewhat, the absolute  amount of  investment  going to the Asian 
newly industrializing countries (NICs) and the rapidly industrializing ASEAN 
countries increased sharply. Equally important, Japan’s  significance  to these 
countries as an investor (compared to the United States and the European Com- 
munity) grew, and, among developing areas, the importance of developing Asia 
as a field for Japanese investment became clearer (Doner, chap. 5 in this vol- 
ume; Petri, chap. 1 in this volume; Omori and Takata 1992, 146-47). 
The search for cost advantages in East and Southeast Asia following enduku 
(strong yen) is clear in the pattern as well as the direction of Japanese foreign 
direct investment during these years. Unlike earlier emphasis on import substi- 
tuting investments in the region (encouraged by local policies), this wave of 
Japanese investment, concentrated in manufacturing, served to develop a dy- 
namic division of labor in the region. It reinforced the popular ‘‘flying geese” 
model of regional development in which Japanese manufacturers gradually re- 
duce the production of labor-intensive  manufactures and transfer those parts 
of  the manufacturing process abroad. In this regard, Japanese manufacturers 
in East and Southeast Asia were simply following the established model of the 
global factory already apparent in Western Europe and the United States. As a 
result, Japanese investment in the region was more export-oriented  than it had 5  Introduction 
been previously, including a high share of  intrafirm trade and an increase in 
exports to the Japanese market (Doner, chap. 5 in this volume; Petri, chap. 1 
in this ~olume).~ 
Evaluating the effects of this influx on host country economic performance 
is controversial and difficult. Petri notes that the trade balance effects of the 
new investments have to date not been as positive as might have been predicted, 
despite their greater export orientation, because they continue to require a high 
level of imported components from abroad. Richard Doner notes that even the 
overall effect of the foreign investment surge on the level of Thailand’s exports 
is disputed, with one study estimating that it accounts for only 10 percent of 
export growth in manufactures (Petri  1992, 24-25).  Whatever its effects on 
levels of economic growth and export expansion, however, Japanese invest- 
ment in manufacturing in Pacific Asia after 1985 has intensified regional eco- 
nomic integration in new ways. 
More important than Japanese direct investment for the two most populous 
Asian countries-China  and Indonesia-are  Japanese flows of aid. Even for 
rapidly industrializing Thailand, which has recently been a magnet for Japa- 
nese investment, aid flows from 1989-91 totaled 35 percent of investment. The 
bilateral aid dominance of Japan in Asia is far more pronounced than is Japan’s 
presence in foreign investment: the United States and Europe are hardly play- 
ers in bilateral aid flows in East and Southeast Asia (Islam, chap. 8 in this 
volume). The integrating function of aid, however, may rest in its characteris- 
tics rather than its volume. Observers of Japanese aid policy agree that it is 
concentrated more in economic infrastructure than is the aid of  most of  the 
industrialized countries (Islam, chap. 8 in this volume). Considerable attention 
has been directed to explicit attempts on the part of the Japanese government 
to link the aid program to infrastructural improvements that would benefit Jap- 
anese investors, most  notably in the New Aid Plan announced by  MITI in 
1987. Critical observers saw an effort to replicate Japanese industrial policy 
on a grand scale. Others, including some of the authors in this volume (Islam, 
Katzenstein and Rouse, and Doner), see a new label for an old pattern of aid, 
a grandiose program designed to expand the bureaucratic influence of MITI in 
the foreign aid process that is contested by  its bureaucratic foes, one that is 
unlikely to be implemented according to the designs of ministries in Tokyo. 
The investment-aid nexus has produced a weak set of  institutions on the 
bilateral and national levels and none at the regional level, although the pro- 
posal  of  Malaysian  prime  minister  Mahathir for an  East  Asian  Economic 
Group or Caucus might be seen as a functional response to the new Japanese 
production network in Southeast Asia. If a new investment-based regionaliza- 
tion can be identified, it may be grounded more on diverse institutions that 
encourage collaboration between governments and business, institutions that 
3. For  a model of  the effects of foreign direct investment on  an  ASEAN economy, see Petri 
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are quasi-public at best. Such institutions are being established between Japan 
and both public and private actors in Pacific Asia. Doner notes several institu- 
tional innovations that can be traced to the new pattern of investment and aid, 
such as imitation of Japanese patterns of industrial policy and public-private 
collaboration and the development of subcontracting networks similar to those 
in Japanese manufacturing. Japan has sponsored nothing as ambitious as the 
Singapore-backed  growth triangle that aims to link infrastructural improve- 
ment and Singaporean capital with Malaysian and Indonesian land and labor.4 
Does the new pattern  of  investment and aid in Pacific Asia augur a new- 
model “bloc” centered on Japan? Clearly, economic regionalism of this kind, 
weakly  institutionalized, would be based on a particular form of economic 
integration, encouraged but not directed by government policy, producing in 
turn weak bilateral and international institutions. Hints of this sort of a “bloc” 
can be teased out of some of the contributions in this volume, but this type of 
grouping, even if it were to emerge, would bear little resemblance to the tightly 
organized and politically circumscribed blocs of the 1930s or even to the con- 
temporary European Community. It would be a “bloc” for the era of fiber op- 
tics  and informatics  rather  than  for the  age of  coal,  steel, and  agriculture. 
Should it take shape, it would be aid- and investment-driven, not trade-driven 
(although presumably  investment would influence regional trade patterns).  It 
would be sectoral rather than territorial in scope: integration of the electronics 
or automobile industries throughout the region rather than all of the economic 
activities in Pacific Asia. Japanese government involvement would be oblique, 
supporting informal institutions that would offer information and infrastruc- 
ture to Japanese investors, reducing the risks for private  investment  (Doner, 
chap. 5 in this volume). Finally, the channels of Japanese influence would in- 
clude the influence that key investors in important industrial sectors are likely 
to have on host governments, host government calculations of anticipated Japa- 
nese reactions to their policy initiatives, and above all, differential access to in- 
f~rmation.~ 
The authors offer no conclusive evidence  that  such a  1990s-model bloc 
is taking shape in Pacific Asia. Indeed, to use the term bloc precisely, a dem- 
onstration of discrimination against European or American investors and ex- 
porters must be demonstrated.  One could imagine that some of  the “neural 
networks”6 taking shape in the region might have such discriminatory implica- 
tions, particularly the subcontracting webs described by Doner. Nevertheless, 
4.  On the current status of this plan, see Lee (1991). 
5. As Albert 0. Hirschman (1980, 16-17)  noted in his classic study of international influence 
and economic transactions, “For the political or power implications of trade to exist and to make 
themselves felt, it is not essential that the state should exercise positive action, i.e., organize and 
direct trade centrally; the negative nght of veto on trade with which every sovereign state is in- 
vested is quite sufficient.” 
6. This phrase was coined at the Del Mar conference by Gregory Noble. 7  Introduction 
many of the activities of the Japanese government in the region, particularly in 
the provision of  infrastructure, are public goods from which other investors 
and exporters cannot be excluded (Katzenstein and Rouse, chap. 6 in this vol- 
ume; Islam, chap. 8 in this volume). Without discrimination, the assertions of 
a bloc-in-formation lose much of their meaning. 
The authors in this volume offer several powerful reasons to doubt that even 
a regional grouping of  this “softer” variety will emerge. The public goods 
character of  many  of  the instruments at Japanese disposal has already been 
mentioned. The leveling off and decline of Japanese foreign direct investment 
after 1990 suggests that at least part of the post-1985 surge in investment was 
a portfolio adjustment. The level of  Japanese manufacturing investment in 
Southeast Asia appears likely to remain stable, however, within the constraints 
of infrastructural bottlenecks (Petri, chap. 1 in this volume; Omori and Takata 
1992, 142, 146). The apparently unstoppable outflow of Japanese capital after 
1985 may have been misread as a permanent feature in the life of the region. 
More important, Japan is not the only actor whose investment is weaving 
together a regional pattern of production and trade. The East Asian NICs have 
recently rivaled and even surpassed Japan as investors in some of the countries 
of Southeast Asia. By 1991, for example, the cumulative investment position 
of the four Asian NICs in Indonesia had begun to approach that of Japan; it 
was the substantial investment of  the NICs in the late 1980s and  1990s that 
spurred the export of manufactures from Indonesia (Kuntjoro-Jakti 1992). Tai- 
wan was among the top three foreign investors in Malaysia; it also occupied a 
very  strong position in  Thailand. The  immediate stimulus to  overseas in- 
vestment in these cases was the same real exchange rate appreciation and cost 
considerations that had spurred Japanese investment. Although the evidence is 
anecdotal at this point, investment from the NICs does not seem related prima- 
rily to Japanese investment networks or global production strategies: these are 
in large measure new investment entrants in the regional economy. Their rapid 
emergence does not suggest a sphere of unchallenged Japanese investment pre- 
dominance. 
The prominence of NIC investment in recent years suggests further diversi- 
fication of the sources of foreign investment. The national governments of the 
region have demonstrated that they have both the instruments and the will to 
push diversification despite the perceived benefits of Japanese investment and 
aid. Peter Katzenstein and Martin Rouse document the efforts of Thailand to 
award  infrastructure contracts  to  non-Japanese firms.  Understandably, the 
ASEAN governments have no desire to award Japanese investors or the Japa- 
nese government the bargaining leverage of a monopolist. 
A final bamer to a regional arrangement that might be both more formal 
and more discriminatory is the continuing dependence of both Japan and the 
Pacific Asian economies on the American market. The threat of  American 
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lization of the Japanese aid-investment network in the region is likely to prove 
an imposing obstacle, as it did for the modest proposal of Dr. Mahathir.’ 
Regionalism and International Conflict 
Although  concern over conflict between Japan and the United  States has 
centered on bilateral trade conflict and its possible spillovers into political and 
security  collaboration,  any  move  toward  Japan-centered  regionalism  also 
threatens conflict with the United States. Fifty years ago, worsening conflict 
between the two countries was owed to Japan’s expansionist policies in East 
and Southeast Asia. No one is predicting a reappearance of conflict of that 
intensity, but an array of models suggests that movement toward regional blocs 
could intensify international conflict between the United States and Japan. 
One familiar argument holds that declining power differentials between a 
dominant  power  and  its  rivals  produce  heightened  conflict. Some political 
scientists have elaborated this view  in the vocabulary  of  hegemonic cycles; 
others have proposed a more general power-transition theory of conflict. Such 
models suggest that a Japan-centered region in Asia would add to the anxieties 
of a United States already concerned over Japan’s rapid economic rise: “Other 
things being equal, the greater (and more rapid) the relative economic decline 
of the United States vis-a-vis Japan (and Germany), the more difficult will be 
the problem of global security adjustment, as well as global economic adjust- 
ment” (Destler 1991). As Destler argues, the probability  of Japan’s becoming 
the single dominant power is small, but its regional dominance must be assi- 
gned a higher likelihood. For Pacific Asia to be seen as a power resource for 
an ascendant Japan, however, the organization of the region  would need to 
acquire the  character  of  a “hard”  regionalism,  politically  determined,  with 
much greater institutional development and economic concentration than cur- 
rently exists. 
Quite apart from the addition of  economic dependents to a rival’s  power 
resources, it was long a matter of received faith in American policymaking that 
a regionalized world economy would not only lower world economic welfare 
but  also produce  heightened political  and military  conflict. That influential 
reading of the history of the 1930s shaped American attitudes toward postwar 
institutions-biasing  the  United  States  toward  multilateralism  and  glob- 
alism-but  it is not clear that a world organized in regional blocs would neces- 
sarily succumb to such conflict (unless the blocs were led by predatory powers 
such as Nazi Germany or prewar Japan). In any case, none of the contributors 
to this volume  suggest that we are moving independently to a Pacific Asia 
organized on these lines. Only if the United States and the European Commu- 
nity adopted hard regionalist organizations or if United States-Japan  bilateral 
7. The continued importance of the American market as a barrier to further regional economic 
integration is emphasized by Yung Chul Park and Won-Am Park (1991). 9  Introduction 
conflict  worsened  do some  argue that  an  East  Asian  regional  bloc  might 
emerge.8 
Even  a  weak  form of  regionalism-the  aid and  investment  network  de- 
scribed above-could  spur United States-Japan  conflict. Any perceived  dis- 
crimination against American firms would be read as the export of Japanese 
business practices (such as the keiretsu) that have attracted American atten- 
tion and hostility in Japan itself. Such conflict could, as noted earlier, feed back 
into the political dynamics of Japan and other Pacific Asian countries to cre- 
ate the impetus for the regionalization that the United States sought to avoid. 
Much of  this conflict would  derive as much from American perceptions of 
the  emerging Pacific Asian  system as from the reality  of discrimination or 
closure. 
A final source of conflict, ironically, is the mirror image of concerns over an 
ascendant Japan: the belief that Japan does not contribute enough to the provi- 
sion of international public goods, that it has been a free rider internationally 
and  shows no signs of becoming  a leader. If  in  the first instance, Japan is 
viewed as threatening because it might overtake the United States, in this case 
it is condemned for failing to assume some of the burdens of leadership in 
Pacific Asia. 
Does the Public Goods Paradigm Fit the Issues of United States-Japan 
Cooperation in Pacific Asia? 
How can we give substance to the ideas of leadership and responsibility? It 
is to be hoped that Japan is beginning to exercise more leadership and that the 
United States will not feel threatened by  an expanded role for Japan.  Both 
adjustments require a kind of maturity often lacking. The theory of internatio- 
nal public goods at first seems the most powerful analytical tool for thinking 
about the issues that surround the respective roles of  the United States and 
Japan in the region. The provision of a public good inevitably involves politics 
and institutions; by definition, the international private market cannot provide 
public goods unaided. The theory states that the optimal cooperative solution 
is for two countries to share the burden of helping to promote common goals 
in the region. In the broadest sense, these common goals include promoting 
peace, democracy, and stable, market-oriented  economic development. 
Table 1 illustrates the game for the case in which the public good is spending 
on defense. It could as easily be spending on foreign aid. The noncooperative 
(or Nash) solution is a choice by both countries to save resources by choosing 
low levels of defense spending. The cooperative solution appears in the last 
cell, where both countries choose high defense spending. Americans have ac- 
cused the Japanese of free riding; this would imply a movement to the upper- 
right cell, where Japan leaves the United States to carry the spending burden 
8.  Notably, Ito, chap. 9 in this volume. 10  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler 
Table 1  When Spending on Defense Is a Public Good 
United States cuts spending  United States increases spending 
Japan cuts spending  Underprovision of public good 
Japan increases spending  United States a free rider  Cooperative solution 
Japan a free rider 
alone. What better analytical tool to apply to this problem than the Nash bar- 
gaining game-in  its simplest form, the prisoner’s dilemma-a  tool that is 
shared by economists and political scientists? 
Many policy issues examined by  the papers in this volume can be cast in 
terms of the bargaining game. In addition to defense spending and aid (stan- 
dard instances of “burdensharing”), there are issues of monetary and financial 
policy, protectionism, regional trading blocs,  and foreign direct investment. 
But in virtually every case, this paradigm is crippled by a simple problem: a 
lack of general agreement as to whether the spending or other policy measure 
under consideration is properly considered a public good or a public bad. 
Beginning with the case of defense spending, Americans naturally assume 
that their own defense spending is a public good, but not everyone agrees. 
Shafiqul Islam raises the possibility that it may be a public bad. More impor- 
tantly, as several conference participants  pointed out, Americans, Japanese, 
and  Asians  cannot  agree-even  among  themselves,  let  alone  with  each 
other-whether  Japanese defense spending is a public good or a public bad. 
Identification of Japanese military spending as a public bad was clear during 
the American occupation, when the United States imposed the peace constitu- 
tion. But Americans today accuse Japan of free riding on United States defense 
spending. The United  States evidently has changed its mind in response to 
changed circumstances. One wonders, however, how Americans would react 
to a full-fledged Japanese military buildup. There is no doubt that most Asian 
countries would be alarmed, as Islam, Wing Thye Woo, and others point out. 
In game theory terms, we may be playing the game illustrated in table 2, 
where defense spending is a public bad. Here the noncooperative solution is 
for both players to increase spending-the  arms race that is all too familiar 
from history. The cooperative solution is for both sides to reduce arms expendi- 
tures. Here “cheating” on a cooperative agreement means spending more than 
the other party, not less. 
American complaints that Japan is not living up to its international commit- 
ments because it is spending too little should be viewed in a special light, if the 
level of spending is the outcome of a bargain urged on Japan by past American 
governments in the belief that it would be in everyone’s interest, as Islam points 
out. Similarly, any future American (or Asian) complaints that Japan is spend- 
ing too much on defense will have to be viewed in a special light to the extent 
that  the increased  spending is the outcome of  bargains  urged on Japan by 
American governments. The conclusion is that it is difficult to apply the game 11  Introduction 
Table 2  When Spending on Defense Is a Public Bad 
United States cuts spending  United States increases spending 
Japan cuts spending  Cooperative solution  United States perceived as aggressive 
Japan increases spending  Japan perceived as aggressive  Arms race: overprovision of public bad 
theory paradigm if we are not sure among ourselves whether Japanese defense 
spending is good or bad. 
One might think that Japanese official development assistance (ODA), such 
as assistance to Southeast Asian countries in developing infrastructure, would 
be a clear public good, especially if it is conducted via a multilateral lending 
institution such as the Asian Development Bank. But some observers question 
whether such aid is benign. It is suggested explicitly that Japan uses such aid 
in its own economic interest, and it is suggested implicitly that this trend may 
not be in the interests of the recipients or other participants in the regional 
economy, such as the United States. 
Other public goods issues arise in the financial area. The policy of the U.S. 
Treasury, beginning with the 1984 Yen-Dollar Agreement, has been that Japan 
should promote international use of the yen (for example, in the invoicing of 
trade, denomination of loans, and use by central banks) and that yen internatio- 
nalization is a public good. Jeffry Frieden adds banking regulation and moni- 
toring of international lending to the list of supposed public goods in the world 
financial system. Yet, he points out, it is far from clear that internationalization 
of the yen is in fact in anyone’s interest. Except, perhaps, the interest of Japan: 
the Yen-Dollar Agreement was perhaps the first major example of Takatoshi 
Ito’s second type of United States-Japan  bilateral  negotiations. The United 
States makes demands on Japan that are not obviously in America’s interest, 
but rather, if anything, in Japan’s interest, and Japanese leaders use the gaiatsu 
(foreign pressure) to bring about useful reforms. The 1990 Structural Impedi- 
ments Initiative is the best example of this type of negotiation (Frankel 1990). 
Contributing to the maintenance of  open international markets is a clear 
public good. One would expect the issue of  cooperation in the trade area to 
come up most clearly  in connection with GATT,  specifically the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations, because this is the major international institution 
for cooperation on trade issues. Japan has been a supporter of the Uruguay 
Round. But a true test of the strength of its commitment to the liberal trading 
regime,  particularly  on  the  question  of  rice  imports,  has  been  repeatedly 
postponed by the failure of the Europeans and Americans to come to an agree- 
ment on agriculture. Partly because of this delay and partly because many view 
GATT as pas&, attention has shifted to other aspects of trade. 
The formation of a Pacific Asian trading bloc, which is the focus of the first 
four contributions to this volume, can be viewed in light of the public goods 
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arrangements among the countries of a region, can hurt the rest of the world 
by diverting trade away from nonmembers. The classic proposition of Jacob 
Viner is that world efficiency is improved if trade creation within the bloc is 
greater than trade diversion. Krugman (1991b) reviews reasons why nonmem- 
bers may be made worse off. First, the presumption is that there will be a shift 
in demand and therefore in the terms of trade away from nonmembers, even 
with no increase in the level of trade barriers, such as tariffs, applied against 
them. Second, if each political unit sets its level of trade barriers in an econo- 
mically maximizing way, the formation of a trading bloc will lead to a higher 
level of barriers against the rest of the world. The grouping has an enhanced 
incentive to protect, as it seeks to exploit a degree of joint monopoly power 
that is greater than that possessed by the individual countries. This is a clear 
prisoner’s dilemma situation, as other regions of the world have an incentive to 
retaliate by forming their own trading blocs, raising barriers, and exploiting 
their own monopoly power. In this model (Krugman 1991a), the formation of 
trading blocs is a public bad (and an equilibrium of three blocs turns out to be 
particularly bad!).9 
“New wave” international trade theory, which emphasizes imperfect compe- 
tition, increasing returns to scale, and endogenous technology, has reinvigor- 
ated  questions  of  strategic  trade  policy  with  findings  that  unilateral  U.S. 
government activism can under certain conditions pay off (such as subsidizing 
aircraft manufacture, where oligopolistic rents are important, or semiconduc- 
tors, where learning-by-doing is important). But in each case, the logic gene- 
rally  leads  to the  conclusion  that  the  Nash  noncooperative  equilibrium  in 
which the United  States, the European  Community, and Japan all subsidize 
aircraft or  semiconductors is an equilibrium in which everyone is worse off, 
contrary to widespread impressions. New wave trade theory is a strong argu- 
ment in favor of worldwide cooperation to refrain from such activity, in favor 
of negotiation and enforcement of international agreements such as GATT. 
These implications of the theory extend to trading blocs. Everyone will be 
better off under an international agreement that forbids regional organizations 
from seeking  to exploit  their  monopoly  power.  GATT  adopted  the  most- 
favored nation principle and allowed for deviations from it to form free trade 
areas only under certain restrictions. GATT’s Article 24 forbids, for example, 
an increase in tariffs by regional trading arrangements. Those rules have been 
bent in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and other parts of the world. Japan 
does not in fact have any sort of preferential trading arrangements in Asia, so 
that the issue of GATT compatibility does not arise. As noted above, the au- 
9. But Krugman (1991b) can just as easily come up with a model (one in which transportation 
costs between continents are extremely high, in contrast to his earlier model where they are as- 
sumed to be zero) in which a world of trading blocs is good. If  this type of model is the right one, 
then a regional power, such as Japan in Asia, the United States in the Western Hemisphere, or 
Germany or France in Europe, who is large enough to take the initiative to organize a trading bloc 
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thors in this volume endorse the view that trade in East and Southeast Asia, in 
contrast to North America and the European Community, does not demonstrate 
a trend toward intraregional concentration. To  the contrary, Japan and other 
East Asian economies remain highly dependent economically on trade with 
North America. 
Kenneth Froot and David Yoffie add foreign direct investment to a model of 
the Krugman type, where the formation of  a trading bloc is a public bad be- 
cause of  the incentive to raise protectionist barriers. Their conclusion is that, 
when a bloc lets in such investment, it creates a constituency for trade liberali- 
zation and reduces its incentive to protect. Here a country's willingness to let 
in direct investment is a public good. This logic naturally leads to concerns 
about Japan, as far more direct investment is seen originating in Japan than 
entering there.'O On the other hand, fears of  domination by  foreign investors 
often have more of a home in populist politics than they have a basis in reality. 
Some point out, in contrast to the Froot-Yoffie argument, that a country that is 
host to foreign direct investment has a ready hostage that increases its bargain- 
ing power, whether in economic or military competition." This argument sug- 
gests that it is Japan, not its Asian neighbors or the United States, that should 
fear a vulnerability arising from transplanted Japanese firms on foreign soil. 
Concerns about  sensitive technologies can amplify the case for the United 
States to encourage Japan to locate operations in the United States. 
It is striking that in so many of the most significant issues-military  spend- 
ing, ODA, internationalization of  the currency, regional integration, foreign 
direct investment-Americans  (and Asians) have trouble agreeing whether 
they want Japan to do more or to do less. In some areas of policy, public goods 
can more easily be distinguished from public bads. This should be the case in 
areas of  environmental protection, weapons proliferation, and human rights, 
which were not examined in this project. Even in these areas, however, differ- 
ent countries have different views about the relative importance of protecting 
marine mammals versus addressing global warming, of reducing the arsenals 
of the superpowers versus slowing proliferation to developing countries, or of 
protecting free speech versus accepting refugees. 
Japanese are themselves divided over many of these issues. In some cases 
the outlines of the political divisions within Japan are strikingly similar to divi- 
sions within the United States and other countries. The debate between those 
in  favor of  a renewal of  Japanese military capability and those opposed is 
a Right-versus-Left debate that is familiar from recent history in the West. 
Frieden points out that the debate between internationalists and nationalists in 
Japan (or what Funabashi [  19881 calls internationalists and domesticists) is 
analogous to debates in the United States, particularly in the 1920s when it 
10. As pointed out by Dennis Encarnation (1992). among others at the conference. 
11. Graham and Krugman (1991). This argument was also made by Robert Lipsey at the con- 
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was the isolationists who carried the day. Frieden argues that the international- 
ists may be gaining the upper hand in Japan, just as they eventually did in the 
United  States  during  the  1940s. Even  the  alignment  of  economic  interest 
groups is often similar in Japan and the West: nationalist farmers oppose eco- 
nomic liberalization, by appealing to the much larger urban population with 
nostalgic recollections of the country’s cultural traditions, while international- 
ist financiers  support economic liberalization, by  appealing to the country’s 
international obligations. 
In other respects the outlines of  political  divisions in Japan  are different 
from those in the United States. Ito points out the importance in Japan of  a 
division between bureaucrats and politicians, as compared to a division in the 
United States between a market-oriented White House and a trade-hawk Con- 
gress. Institutional specifics are important in each case. In Japan the method 
whereby districts choose members of the Diet encourages candidates to cater 
in direct economic ways to special interest groups, as Frances Rosenbluth em- 
phasizes in her comment. But at least the Japanese social system, through the 
process of nemawashi (consensus building), allows the country to speak in the 
international arena with a relatively unified position. In the United States, di- 
vided government has precluded the country from speaking to its trading part- 
ners with a single voice. Such divisions in each country lead to what Putnam 
(1988) calls two-level games: any internationally agreed position must be rati- 
fied by the domestic groups who are enfranchised on a given issue. 
Japan and the United States as Leaders in Pacific Asia 
The ambiguities in  a public goods analysis of  collaboration  between  the 
United States and Japan in Pacific Asia lend support to predictions that devel- 
opment of joint leadership in the region will prove difficult or impossible. Neo- 
realist analysis, in which narrowing power differentials produce heightened 
conflict,  could  suggest  an  even  more  pessimistic  view-that  overt United 
States-Japan  conflict is inevitable. Two features of the present international 
situation might be singled out in this view in support of this bleaker image of 
the future. The dissolution of the Soviet threat will place pressure on the United 
States-Japan  security relationship-alliances  do not long survive the threats 
that called them into being. Equally important, as Japan increases its economic 
weight and technological  capabilities, a logic of  relative gains will-in  the 
absence of a common enemy-swamp  the joint interests that the two countries 
still have in the region and undermine collaboration. A United States fearful 
of  its new economic challenger will increasingly view Japanese success and 
initiative as a threat, even though American pressure may have originally en- 
couraged Japanese assertiveness. 
Despite this forbidding possibility, broad agreement between the two powers 
in their aims for Pacific Asia is likely to prevent any leap from present-day 
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countries still share a strong interest in maximizing the extent to which people 
in this region are living in stable, democratic, market-oriented societies that do 
not impose negative externalities or spillovers (such as pollution  or weapons 
proliferation) on other countries. Conflict has already occurred and remains 
very likely, however, in designing a structure of joint leadership in the region 
that will maximize these goals. In part, the difficulty lies, as described above, 
in defining the precise policies to be undertaken by both the United States and 
Japan and the relative sharing of the burdens, both military and economic, of 
a leadership role. More important, a stable structure of joint leadership will 
require wrenching political adjustments on both sides in order to construct a 
political base for that structure, a base as stable as the existing supports for an 
alliance relationship that is now under strain. 
Americans worry that Japan is not ready politically to take on the leadership 
role that would be commensurate with its economic importance. Some Japa- 
nese share this concern and would prefer the United States to remain the leader. 
Frieden’s account of America’s disengaged international  stance in the  1920s 
and 1930s poses the possibility that Japan will shift toward greater leadership 
and that the transit may take some time. The Japanese political system, in par- 
ticular, is already demonstrating the difficulties of adjusting to a new role. The 
old “Yoshida line” held that Japan’s international business would be business. 
Many Americans and Japanese alike (e.g., Ito, chap. 9 in this volume) worry 
that Japan continues to lack the ideals or principles required for international 
leadership. To  the  degree that it has a national ideology, it is based on the 
hoarding of technology (as David Friedman and Richard Samuels argue in this 
volume) or on a simple sense of national uniqueness. 
New internationalists such as Yoichi Funabashi and Shinichi Kitaoka now 
argue that Japan should break from the Yoshida line and pursue a more active 
international policy based on such fundamental principles as promoting de- 
mocracy, economic development, and environmental protection. This school is 
an encouraging alternative to the traditional extreme choices of Right and Left: 
on the one hand, Shintaro Ishihara and others who argue for a strong indepen- 
dent international presence but arouse suspicions of resurgent Japanese mili- 
tarism; on the other, unreconstructed  socialists who have long opposed any 
Japanese  military capabilities  and  distrust  American  hegemony  and  whose 
economic ideology has never come to terms with the facts of East Asian dyna- 
mism. When Kiichi Miyazawa became prime minister, it was thought that he 
might break from the Yoshida line. But he encountered deep and persistent 
resistance in his efforts to push new initiatives-such  as involvement by Japan 
in peacekeeping  operations-through  the scandal-weakened Japanese politi- 
cal system. 
The United States must undertake an adjustment equal in difficulty to that 
of Japan. Americans must adjust to the fact that sharing leadership with Japan 
does not mean simply sending Tokyo the bill, whether it is for military opera- 
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Bergsten has said of transfers to the United States in connection with the 1991 
Gulf War, “We now know the definition of collective leadership: the United 
States leads and the United States collects.” I2  Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid 
the most, followed by Japan, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates in that 
order. The total, with $37 billion of international commitments  actually re- 
ceived by mid-1991, was enough to wipe out the United States trade deficit in 
goods and services in the first half of the year and produce a small surplus on 
the overall current account. 
The United States must grant Japan a share of power in decision making 
that is commensurate with its financial contribution. “No taxation without rep- 
resentation” is not simply an ideal of American democracy; it is also a positive 
statement that a people who are denied a say in how their money is spent will 
eventually refuse to continue paying. In concrete terms the United States may 
need to support granting Japan expanded voting power in the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, top management positions in the International Monetary Fund or 
the World Bank, and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
Greater attention will be required to the alternative model of economic devel- 
opment that Japan has begun to offer in the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. 
Several of the authors in this volume make clear that it is the American 
political system that may prove the most recalcitrant to the demands for a new 
structure of joint leadership in the region. Perhaps the worst outcome would 
be an American withdrawal from Pacific Asia after assessing few economic 
gains (given Japanese ubiquity in the region) and many, largely military, costs. 
Such a policy shift could induce both a “hardening” of regional structures un- 
der Japanese leadership and eventually a remilitarization of Japan. This nega- 
tive dynamic works primarily through American perceptions as played out in 
the American political process. But if the domestic adjustments in Japan and 
the United States are successful-a  daunting prerequisite-then  there are rea- 
sons to believe that conflicts over leadership and burdensharing in the provision 
of public goods may persist at only at a relatively low (and familiar) level. 
Many of the international public goods to be provided are not regional but 
global, and Western Europe, particularly Germany, is as likely to be the target 
of  American displeasure as Japan. (This was the pattern after the Gulf War.) 
The end of the Cold War means an erosion of common agreement on external 
security threats and divergence over defining public goods and bads, as de- 
scribed earlier. But the more relaxed security environment also means that the 
most contentious public good-military  security-can  be provided  at lower 
levels. It is also worth noting that a suboptimal provision of international public 
goods, however defined, need not mean chaos or catastrophe in every instance. 
For example, should the Cambodian peacekeeping operation break down be- 
12. “Burdensharing in the Gulf and Beyond,” testimony before the House Committee on Ways 
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cause Japan and the United States are unable to agree with the other interested 
parties on an acceptable sharing of military and economic costs, the Cambo- 
dian people will face continued military conflict and much collective suffering, 
but the rest of  the Pacific Asian region could continue its economic progress 
with little effect. 
Finally, it is worth considering the perspective of the other countries in the 
region on the balance between cooperation and rivalry in U.S. relations with 
Japan. Intensified conflict at the levels of the 1930s would clearly be damaging 
to the development prospects of  societies in the region. On the other hand, a 
certain degree of  competition between the United States and Japan may  be 
beneficial. Duopoly power awarded the United States and Japan by a structure 
of close collaboration in, for example, the provision of development assistance 
or the management of  trade, may  not be the preferred outcome for smaller 
countries economically dependent on American and Japanese capital and mar- 
kets. For lesser powers in the region, a preferred future order for Pacific Asia 
may  be one of restrained competition between the two economic giants, not 
two-power condominium, one-country dominance, or unbridled rivalry. 
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